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Wealth without Markets?
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz*
(forthcoming 116 YALE L.J. (2007))
In June of 2006, Texas Governor Rick Perry announced a $5 million plan to
install night-vision equipped web cams along the state’s border with Mexico and launch a
web site that would allow virtual minutemen to monitor portions of the border from their
homes and workplaces. The web site would provide a toll-free hotline allowing people
around the country to notify law enforcement personnel if they spotted suspected illegal
immigrants on their computer screens.1
Around the same time, something subtly related happened. Internet blog posters
began bemoaning a frightening new phenomenon on Skype, the increasingly successful
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service that allows its users to make free long
distance calls to other Skype members across the globe. The phenomenon was
telemarketing, and blog commenters began discussing the obvious solution to the
problem: setting one’s Skype preferences so that the user would only receive calls from a
pre-approved list of callers known to the Skype user.2
Both these stories emerged roughly contemporaneously with the appearance of
Yochai Benkler’s important and influential book, The Wealth of Networks: How Social
Production Transforms Markets and Freedom.3 That seems appropriate, because the two
stories offer the beginnings of a rebuttal to Benkler’s eloquent opening argument about
the ways in which nonmarket production is transforming our economic and political
systems. Benkler tells us that “social production” will make us freer, richer, and happier
unless our pesky lawmakers get in its way. But some of the events that accompanied the
publication of his book, along with events that preceded it, suggest that law may be the
least of social production’s worries.
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Sarah Scaife Foundation for research support.
1
Alicia A. Caldwell, Texas Governor Proposes Webcams Along Border, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 9,
2006, at 2A.
2
See http://digg.com/software/Telemarketing_on_Skype_Our_worst_fears_being_realised_. For many
professors of intellectual property law, this development came as no surprise. In April of 2005 at a
Fordham Law School conference, Tim Wu predicted that once Internet telephony lowered the costs of long
distance voice communications to zero, there would be an onslaught of telemarketing and voice-spam. Wu
scared the heck out of the assembled professors by asking us to envision having our dinners routinely
interrupted by callers informing us of unique business opportunities to recover unclaimed money held in
Nigerian bank accounts.
3
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM (2006).
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In this Book Review, I will scrutinize Benkler’s claims that social production is
transforming our world. Along the way, I will highlight the dangers that social production
inevitably faces. Some of these dangers stem from legal rules and interventions, as
Benkler anticipates. But basic economic forces and social trends pose far greater threats
to the flourishing of communications technology-aided social production. Finally, I will
challenge Benkler’s most striking and ambitious claim, his conclusion that social
production will lessen the gap between rich and poor.
Part I restates the core of Benkler’s argument and examines its contributions to
the fields of intellectual property and economic theory. Along the way, it critiques several
of Benkler’s central premises, and perhaps a few peripheral ones.
Part II examines the primary threats facing social production in the coming years.
The discussion focuses on three bases for skepticism about the transformational power of
social production. First, social production efforts that seem quite promising when they
attract sophisticated, self-selected users can seem less so when their user bases begin
better reflecting the broader demographics of society. Second, when proprietary firms are
competing with social producers, they can adopt competitive strategies that successfully
target the excess capacity that enables social production. Third, proprietary firms have
already shown the ability to appropriate the strategies of social producers, with firms like
eBay, Linden Labs, and MySpace earning substantial profits off the social production of
their user bases.
Part III devotes sustained attention to the most audacious portion of Benkler’s
book: his claim that the growth of nonmarket production will diminish the gap between
the haves and the have-nots. This Part suggests that social production writ large could
enhance the rich-poor gap, through the proliferation of socially produced reputation
systems. Counterintuitively, however, this development may be desirable because of its
beneficial incentive effects and its potential to render society more meritocratic. Even if
Benkler’s assessment about social production’s inherent progressivity is correct,
however, one wonders whether he has identified the appropriate set of tools for tackling
global inequality.
I. Assessing the Wealth of Networks
The Wealth of Networks is an unusually ambitious book, an epic that lends
structure to the economic and technological transformations that the world has already
experienced, and provides an imaginative but well-reasoned account of how these
transformations will accelerate in the coming years. Benkler’s methodology is
particularly apt for someone who valorizes the re-mix culture and cumulative innovation.
He stands on the shoulders of giants4 like Ronald Coase and Robert Titmuss, creatively
adapting their insights to profoundly new circumstances. In so doing, Benkler shows the
reader a vast intellectual terrain that would not have been apparent otherwise. In this Part
4

The phrase was borrowed from Sir Isaac Newton’s letter to Robert Hooke, which stated, “If I have seen
further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” Aptly enough, Newton borrowed this phrase from
earlier writers, and the first known use of the phrase was by Bernard of Chartres, in approximately 1130.
For a discussion, see On the Shoulders of Giants, available in
<http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/history/q0162b.shtml> (visited October 24, 2006).

2

I will provide a brief description of that terrain, peppering that overview with praise or
skepticism when pertinent.
I. A. On the Shoulders of Aristotle: Explaining Excess Capacity
Yochai Benkler has written a book about social production. It is therefore a little
frustrating that Benkler does not provide a clear definition of the term. The closest
Benkler comes to a definition is his statement that social production encompasses all
efforts to create content that “are not based on exclusive proprietary claims, not aimed
toward sales on a market for either motivation or information, and not organized around
property and contract claims to form firms or market exchanges.”5
Benkler argues, convincingly, that a large portion of the wealth that exists in
society arises from these nonproprietary motivations. A lost tourist perhaps would pay
me a dime or a dollar for clear directions to Soldier Field, but I provide the information
free of charge. A wealthy benefactor anonymously donates millions to ovarian cancer
research after having lost a loved one to that terrible disease. A drifter foregoes
Greyhound, hitching a ride with a big rig headed for Kalamazoo.6 Add up the economic
value of these various services, performed daily around the world, and old economy
social production becomes quite significant in economic terms. As Benkler observes,
excess capacity often drives social production.7 I give clearer directions when I am not
rushing to the airport; the wealthy philanthropist has more money than she can spend on
herself; and the truck driver has extra space in his cab. While Benkler is right to zero in
on the role of excess capacity in facilitating social production,8 that relationship is one
that Aristotle grasped.9 After all, democracy itself is in many respects a socially produced
resource relying on the leisure time of its citizens as an essential input.10 Indeed, socially
produced democratic texts, such as the American Constitution, relied heavily on the
contributions of the landed aristocracy, who had the luxury of ruminating about the ideal

5

Id. at 105.
These examples are inspired by Benkler’s discussion on 117-18.
7
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 100, 115.
8
There are, of course, exceptions, and when we observe social production without excess capacity we are
usually watching humanity at its noblest: poverty-stricken families take in strangers displaced by Hurricane
Katrina; firefighters face nearly certain death in an attempt to save innocent workers in the World Trade
Center; ordinary people incur substantial medical risks to donate bone marrow or even kidneys to strangers
needing transplants. These exceptions, however, are rare enough to underscore the persuasiveness of
Benkler’s point. When contributing to a collective good is costly for individuals, anonymous contributions
will be rare.
9
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, Book VII, ch. IX, at 210-11 (Carnes Lord ed. 1984). (“[I]t is evident from
these things that in the city that is most finely governed . . . the citizens should not live a vulgar or a
merchant’s way of life, for this sort of way of life is ignoble and contrary to virtue. Nor, indeed, should
those who are going to be citizens in such a regime be farmers, for there is a need for leisure both with a
view to the creation of virtue and with a view to political activities.”).
10
So are social norms, which explains why legal scholars who rely on rational actor models have had to
labor to explain norms’ existence and enforcement. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2000); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001).
6
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form of government because they could survive on the work and income of slaves,
tenants, and spouses.11
Of course Benkler’s focus is on the present day, not the Greek or Founding eras,
and today we see Aristotle’s intuition about excess capacity playing out in many sectors.
Users of peer-to-peer networks are more likely to upload files to anonymous strangers
when they have excess bandwidth to spare.12 Computer enthusiasts are happy to
participate in SETI@home, which harnesses their excess computing power to aid in the
search for extraterrestrial intelligence, because their computers spend hours a day idling
and electricity is rather cheap.13 And there exist, scattered around the world, Wikipedia
contributors with extra time on their hands and an interest in contributing to a valuable
public good.14 There are, to be sure, important differences between the excess physical
capital that drives peer-to-peer sharing and the excess human capital that drives
Wikipedia, differences explored more fully below.15
I.B.

On the Shoulders of Titmuss: A Theory of Social Production

If we understand social production to encompass all forms of production that do
not rely on rights-based exclusion, then Benkler’s framework identifies six types of social
production. Three of these are motivated by proprietary motives. These include the
“Scholarly Lawyer” strategy, employed by people like Howard Bashman of the How
Appealing blog,16 who uses his terrific and free blog to generate clients and name
recognition; the “Know-How” strategy, whereby firms develop and hoard in-house
innovations that they use to create more competitive markets; and the “Learning
Network,” such as the A.P. wire service, which is a cooperative venture funded by a
number of newspapers.17 Although Benkler spends a lot of time discussing Scholarly
Lawyers, his book largely ignores the “Know-How” and “Learning Network” models.
This is appropriate. After all, the Know-How model usually relies on trade secret law, a
rights-based exclusion system, to guard against misappropriation of innovations by exemployees or third parties. And learning networks have long been subjected to scrutiny
by legal scholars, particularly those who work in the antitrust area.18
Benkler’s other three categories are the most interesting. These are what he calls
nonexclusion-nonmarket production strategies. Benkler dubs the first approach “Joe
Einstein,” reflecting the motivations of the individual who produces something valuable,
and then gives that valuable resource away, perhaps for altruistic reasons, or perhaps to
11

Indeed, it is useful to consider the Constitution as an example of social production, with James Madison
playing the part of Linus Torvalds.
12
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 86.
13
Id. at 82.
14
Id. at 375.
15
See infra sections II.A. and II.B.
16
See <http://howappealing.law.com> (visited Nov. 3, 2006).
17
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 43 tbl. 2.1.
18
See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Joint Production Ventures, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 253 (1990);
Michelle K. Lee & Mavis K. Lee, High Technology Consortia: A Panacea for America’s Technological
Competitiveness Problems?, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 335 (1991); Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet
Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 (1996).
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enhance his reputation. Two other nonmarket approaches include the “Los Alamos”
approach, which seems to merely be the “Know-How” approach employed by the
government, and the “Limited Sharing Network,” where a small group of individuals,
such as a law school faculty, help each other become better Joe Einsteins, by reading and
commenting on each other’s papers.19 Again, though, the “Los Alamos” and “Limited
Sharing Networks” fade into the background of Benkler’s book, and he focuses most of
his attention on Joe Einsteins. Really, then, Benkler’s book is about two phenomena: the
more altruistic Joe Einstein and the less altruistic Scholarly Lawyer.
Recent events, such as the Youtube lonelygirl15 affair,20 suggest that apparent Joe
Einsteins are often Scholarly Lawyers in disguise. Sensibly, Benkler does not seem to
want to police the boundaries of his typology too rigidly. Forms of social production like
blogging, open source programming, and peer-to-peer file sharing seem characterized by
a mix of motivations, be they altruistic, status-oriented, or proprietary. For example,
many open source programmers see participation in an open source project as a valuable
resume builder and a promising pathway to startup venture capital funding, or are
encouraged to contribute to the project by their employers, but other contributors seem
genuinely motivated by a desire to solve a vexing technical problem, participate in a team
effort, or help others.21 Scholars argue about what sorts of motivations predominate in
particular settings, and these are indeed interesting research questions, but the presence of
some other-regarding preferences and the absence of immediate market transactions
seems like a clear enough basis for characterizing the “social production” phenomenon.
That said, to the extent that some participants in social production projects are merely
seeking delayed returns from the marketplace (i.e., enhanced reputations that they can
later convert into employment or endorsement opportunities), social production seems
increasingly evolutionary and decreasingly revolutionary.
Benkler’s next claim is that social production is often a better method for creating
wealth than relying on old-fashioned incentives, such as monetary payments and
exclusive private property rights.22 As Benkler notes, Robert Titmuss made essentially
the same claim about the blood “market” in 1970, arguing that a regime relying on
voluntary donations would produce a more reliable supply for transfusions than a system
in which people were paid for blood.23 Note that on Titmuss’s account too the presence of
excess capacity is what makes the altruistic regime work: Donors have more blood than
their bodies need and are willing to spend one half hour or so at a blood bank to do a
good deed.24 Titmuss’s conclusions have been second guessed in the intervening years,25
19

Id.
Tom Zeller Jr., Lonelygirl15: Prank, Art, or Both?, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 16, 2006, at 4-16 (describing the
controversy created when an actress posed as a home-schooled teenager broadcasting to a very large
audience on Youtube).
21
See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 213-20
(2002); David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 260-81.
22
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 115-16.
23
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 93 (citing RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN
BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1970)).
24
Where donation is more cumbersome, as with bone marrow, donation is far less common. See generally
Roberta G. Simmons et al., The Self-Image of Unrelated Bone Marrow Donors, 34 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 285 (1993).
20
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and in light of recent advances in blood screening, the question of whether an optimal
blood provision regime relies on paid or charitable contributions is once again debatable.
With respect to a great deal of information content, however, Benkler argues that
the question of optimal incentives is not a close one: Social production does better than
market production.26 To make this counterintuitive argument, Benkler relies on theory
and empirics. The theoretical claim is straightforward and plausible. Benkler says that in
the creative industries, outputs are also inputs.27 For example, when Salman Rushdie
writes a novel, he creates a valuable creative work. But the characters, linguistic
flourishes, themes, and plot devices from Rushdie’s novel can be appropriated by other
authors to create their own novels. So whereas we intuitively understand that by granting
Rushdie insufficient intellectual property rights, he might not have written Midnight’s
Children, Benkler would stress that if Rushdie were granted too strong intellectual
property rights, then he might use those rights to prevent other writers who were
influenced by Rushdie’s work, such as Arundhati Roy and Jhumpa Lahiri, from making
their own contributions to literature. Copyright law has long recognized the “outputs as
inputs” point via doctrines such as the idea-expression dichotomy, and the same logic
explains patent law’s relatively short patent term and nonobviousness as an element of
patentability.28 Of course, this theoretical argument does not answer the hard question of
how much intellectual property protection is optimal. But it does introduce a useful sort
of Laffer curve to the analysis of innovation policy.
Benkler relies on the empirical work of other scholars to suggest that current
patent and copyright protections may be too strong to encourage optimal innovation. He
is particularly impressed with the scholarship of Harvard’s Josh Lerner:
Lerner looked at changes in intellectual property law in sixty countries
over a period of 150 years. He studied close to three hundred policy
changes, and found that, both in developing countries and in economically
advanced countries that already have patent law, patenting both at home
and abroad by domestic firms of the country that made the policy change,
a proxy for their investment in research and development, decreases
slightly when patent law is strengthened! The implication is that when a
country . . . increases its patent protection, it slightly decreases the level of
investment in innovation by local firms.29
Lerner is a first-rate economist, and his work is interesting and informative. But other
first-rate economists have used different methodologies to determine what effects strong
25

Phillipe Fontaine, Blood, Politics, and Social Science: Richard Titmuss and the Institute of Economic
Affairs, 1957-1973, 93 ISIS 401, 423-33 (2002). For a recent assessment of Titmuss’s theoretical
contributions and shortcomings, see Robert Pinker, From Gift Relationships to Quasi-Markets: An Odyssey
Along the Policy Paths of Egoism and Altruism, 40 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 10 (2006).
26
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 116-17, 305-06.
27
Id. at 37.
28
See generally Robert C. Denicola, Copyrights in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 523-24 (1981) (discussing cumulative innovation in
the copyright context); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991) (discussing cumulative innovation in the patent context).
29
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 39.
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intellectual property laws have had on innovation, and have reached very different
conclusions.
M.I.T.’s Petra Moser, for example, has examined the diffusion of innovations
during the nineteenth century in a couple of recent papers. Her 2004 paper in the
American Economic Review studied the innovations that were highlighted at the 1851 and
1876 world’s fairs. She concluded that in nations without patent laws, such as
Switzerland and Denmark in 1851, and Switzerland and Holland in 1876, there was little
innovation in industries like manufacturing and agricultural machinery, where trade
secrecy is a poor substitute for patent protection, and more innovation in industries like
food processing and scientific instruments, where trade secrets do provide a relatively
effective means for maintaining a monopoly on innovation.30 Thus, patent protections do
seem to encourage successful innovation. Her more recent paper, Do Patent Laws Help to
Diffuse Innovations? Evidence from the Geographic Localization of Innovation and
Production in 19th-Century England, concludes that in British industries where firms
relied heavily on patent protection, innovations were more geographically dispersed than
in those industries where patent protection was unavailable or not often sought.31 On the
basis of these data Moser concludes that strong patent protections served an informationforcing purpose, and enhanced socially desirable knowledge spillover across England.32
The research results obtained by Moser, like the research results obtained by
Lerner, are entirely consistent with economic theory. Lerner’s findings are driven by the
insight that creative outputs are also inputs.33 Moser’s findings are driven by the business
reality that the choice for a firm is usually not between patenting an invention and giving
it away for free. Rather, the choice is often between patenting the invention and some
other form of protection, such as maintaining it as a trade secret. If the firm opts for trade
secrecy protection, then it need disclose the invention to neither the public at large nor to
competitors, and its monopoly on the innovation may last longer than the patent term.34 A
firm possessing a valuable innovation as a trade secret may take steps to limit the exodus
of its employees to competitor firms, use encryption and physical security measures to
guard innovations, spread out the insights comprising a valuable trade secret among
several employees so that no individual knows the entire secret, and may try to prevent
the public from finding out not only about how the innovation works but that the
innovation even exists. For all these reasons, trade secrecy protection typically results in
less diffusion of innovations than reliance on patent law does.35

30

Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s
Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214, 1231 (2005).
31
Petra Moser, Do Patent Laws Help to Diffuse Innovations? Evidence from the Geographic Localization
of Innovation and Production in 19th Century England (NBER Working Paper 2005).
32
Id. at 21-23.
33
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 39, 49.
34
David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 61, 63 (1991).
35
An important argument cuts the other way. Trade secrets, unlike product patents, are not protected
against reverse engineering by competitors. Hence it may be that although trade secrets curtail the diffusion
of information about innovations, they enhance the net innovation that occurs in society. Of course, firms
interested in guarding against reverse engineering have begun turning to contractual provisions that prohibit
reverse engineering, and the courts have generally held these provisions enforceable. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Baystate Tech., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Benkler’s book does not discuss trade secrets protection at all;36 a puzzling
omission in a 473-page book about innovation policy. If patent protections are weakened,
as Benkler advocates, then some firms will be driven toward a social production business
model, but some firms will be driven toward a trade secrets business model.37 Even in the
“new” economy, it is hard to believe that the former trend would trump the latter. And
one can construct a compelling argument that society is worse off if more of its
innovations are protected as trade secrets than as patents. Indeed, that persuasive
argument explains the presence of patent laws in every developed nation on Earth.
In short, the empirical evidence concerning the net effects of strengthening
intellectual property protections on innovation is ambiguous. So are the conclusions of
economic theory. Maybe economists will coalesce around a particular view in a decade or
century, but so far a lack of consensus exists among careful scholars. At present, it seems
likely that there are some industries in which a proprietary model based on exclusive
property rights maximizes innovation and others in which that model diminishes
innovation.38 There are places in the book where Benkler seems ready to concede as
much.39 But there are other places where Benkler gets ahead of himself. For example,
Benkler summarizes the literature in this way:
Let us call a rule set that is looser from the perspective of access to
existing information resources Rule Set A, and a rule set that imposes
higher costs on access to information inputs Rule Set B. As explained in
chapter 2, it is quite likely that adopting B would depress information
production and innovation, even if it were intended to increase the
production of information by, for example, strengthening copyright or
patent.40
Broad generalizations like these are in my view premature, especially when
confronted with a growing empirical economics literature that has achieved
decidedly mixed results.
I.C. On the Shoulders of Coase : A Framework for Understanding the Choice of
Production Regimes
Of course, Benkler’s primary contribution in the early sections of the book is not
empirical. He relies on economists like Lerner to do the heavy lifting here. What Benkler
adds to the discussion is a terrific theoretical insight, which is to extend Coasean
economic analysis of the firm to social production via the commons. Here Benkler nicely

36

The book mentions trade secrets once in passing, on page 227, in the context of a discussion about vote
tallying machines and their proprietary software.
37
Trade secrets protection is probably the most common “substitute” for patent protection, but it is not the
only one. Other options include leveraging patents for complementary products, aggressive branding
campaigns that rely on trademark law, and efforts to appropriate large first mover advantages.
38
Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003) (arguing
that patent law does and should look very different in varied industries).
39
See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 3, at 41, 49.
40
Id. at 305-06 (emphasis added).
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recounts his wonderful 2002 article, Coase’s Penguin: Or, Linux and the Nature of the
Firm, which appeared in the pages of this law review.41
Ronald Coase is famous for many things,42 but his scholarship on the nature of the
firm ranks among his most important achievements. Coase saw that a proprietary firm in
the widget business performed some tasks essential to widget-making in-house and relied
on outside contractors, consultants, agents, or suppliers for other equally essential tasks.
What determined which tasks were performed in-house or externally? Coase argued that
the decision to produce in-house was a product of transaction costs. In a competitive
market if the transaction costs of dealing with outside agents or vendors were particularly
high (say, because of the dangers of trade secret misappropriation, or the high costs of
crafting contracts that deal with uncertainties and unforeseen events, or the dangers
associated with strategic behavior), then a firm would be inclined to perform the task inhouse.43 If, by contrast, these and other transaction costs were low, then the widget firm
could be expected to outsource the work via the marketplace. Coase, in short, suggested
that in a competitive market, firms are structured the way they are because of transaction
costs.
Benkler realized that just as transaction costs will sometimes dictate that some
parts of a widget-making operation be outsourced to other firms, they will sometimes
dictate that production occur outside of the proprietary marketplace altogether. This is
where social production comes in. Some resources can be produced most efficiently
neither in-house nor by an outsourced firm, but by a large group of like-minded altruists,
voluntarily contributing to their creation. Typically, the transaction cost savings of using
social production depend on the reduced costs of identifying the person who can best
accomplish a modular task within a larger project and the lessened costs of negotiating
terms of employment with that person.44 After all, the best available person for the job
may well self-identify, and the contributor invariably will receive credit but no cash.45

41

Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE. L.J. 369 (2002). In
Coase’s Penguin, Benkler shied away from characterizing social production as a “more efficient model of
production for information and culture,” stating that “[w]hen peer production will surpass the advantages
that the other two models may have in triggering or directing human behavior through the relatively
reliable and reasonably well-understood triggers of money and hierarchy is a matter for more detailed
study.” Id. at 381.
42
Extraneous citation to Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
43
R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 40-47 (1988).
44
BENKLER, supra note 3, at 111-15.
45
Benkler recognizes the problem of inaccurate self-assessment, where the hapless contributor volunteers
for the difficult project, which he will execute poorly. Id. at 112. Benkler sensibly suggests that the role of
peer review in social production is to reduce the costs of inaccurate self-assessment, but such solutions are
imperfect. Waiting for peer review to correct inaccurate self-assessment and re-open a project for other
volunteers imposes substantial production delays. Indeed, it may be that the proprietary market’s
approaches to this problem (e.g., headhunters, requests for proposals, management consultants, and market
discipline) are often the superior approach. There may also be many circumstances in which another
contributor could have done a far better job on a modular task, but is deterred from doing so by the fact that
someone else already has begun the effort. Cf. Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative
Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005) (discussing the implications of redundancy in
copyright law).
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One of Benkler’s strongest examples of social production provides a nice
illustration of its possibilities. Astronomers at the University of California are engaged in
the process of searching for extra-terrestrial intelligence by analyzing radio astronomy
signals for patterns that might indicate the presence of life outside our solar system. This
is a task requiring enormous computational capacities. To that end, the brilliant folks at
Berkeley had a neat idea: distribute a free screen saver to millions of computer owners.
When these computer owners used their machines to type emails or play video games,
SETI@home would make itself invisible. But when the computer users went to school,
work, or sleep, their SETI@home screen saver would launch, and their machines would
begin downloading small number-crunching problems that would keep the CPUs
occupied until their owners returned.46 Once a notebook computer found the solution to
one problem, it would upload that solution to the SETI@home servers and download a
new problem. By utilizing the excess capacity of millions of notebooks and desktop
machines, Berkeley created the fastest supercomputer in the world—a machine that ran
75 percent faster than the largest single supercomputer heretofore invented: IBM’s Blue
Gene/L.47
Berkeley might have gone a different route. Just as it might have built a single
supercomputer or leased IBM’s machine, it could have paid scattered computer owners
for the temporary use of their excess capacity. But Benkler’s asserts that either approach
would have been inefficient.48 IBM had lots of other uses for Blue Gene/L, making it a
valuable and scarce commodity, and negotiating with individual users might have gotten
complicated and expensive. Should computer owners with faster microprocessors be paid
more? Would Berkeley negotiate with arbitragers? Instead of paying computer users for
resources, and incurring substantial transaction costs trying to best answer these
questions, Berkeley just accepted donations from anyone willing to donate to a worthy
collective cause: locating Wookies, Klingons, or other alien life forms in outer space.
Discussions of the SETI@home program first appeared in the legal literature as far back
as 2000.49 Benkler’s contribution, though, is to show us a world in which SETI@homelike projects are ubiquitous. Indeed, he anticipates that ours will become a world where
SETI@home is the norm and IBM’s Blue Gene/L is the exception.
Where are these ubiquitous SETIs@home? Benkler sees them, convincingly, in
Wikipedia and Slashdot.50 More controversially, he identifies similar forms of social
production in peer-to-peer file swapping networks, open source programming, the World
Wide Web, massive multi-user online games like Second Life, the blogosphere, Internet
search engine algorithms, experimental crop breeding, and WiFi Internet access.51
Indeed, the dangers of writing a book about the Internet are exemplified by the
emergence of new phenomena, such as podcasting, YouTube, Librivox, and MySpace,
46
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that seem to illustrate Benkler’s thesis but were not at the forefront of popular discourse
when Benkler was writing his manuscript. Assessing the terrain, and the buzz generated
by some of these innovations, one gets the distinct impression that Benkler is on to
something big.
Taking his argument further, Benkler says that the social production revolution
will have demand-side effects as well as supply-side effects. More precisely, active
consumers of creative content are different from passive consumers of creative content.
The latter are being manipulated by large media conglomerates who will provide mindnumbingly banal, “lowest common denominator” content52 designed to lull consumers
into a mood that will make them receptive to commercial advertisers’ messages.53 The
former are more demanding of challenging, provocative, and stimulating content, and are
willing to take control over the environments that were spoiled when content creators let
commercial interests trump their artistic integrity.54 Benkler gets worked up about the
vapidity of American pop culture here, noting that if music fans themselves can be tasked
with identifying breakthrough acts, instead of relying on record labels and radio station
conglomerates to do the sorting for them, “fewer mediocre musicians with attractive
physiques will be sold as ‘geniuses.’”55
I do not disagree with Benkler’s assessment that the television programs, music
albums, and books that are most widely watched, listened to, and read by Americans are
usually pretty bad. I will admit to elitism on that front, and lay the blame where Benkler
is reluctant to place it—with the consumers who refused to watch, say, Arrested
Development despite the pleas of television critics across the land. In any event, I do not
wish to rehash the high-culture versus low-culture debates here. My purpose is more
modest. Namely, I want to suggest that although his articulation of these demand-side
arguments is thought-provoking, Benkler has misidentified the villain on this score.
Take television programming, about which Benkler spills the most ink. It is not
the case that the market provides inadequate incentives for the production of excellent
television content aimed at engaging intelligent viewers. The cable network HBO is
extremely profitable.56 It also produces the types of television programs whose absence
Benkler bemoans: stimulating, creative, provocative, critically acclaimed, and
wonderfully addictive shows such as The Sopranos, Six Feet Under, Deadwood, and The
Wire.57 These shows are also quite expensive to produce, relative to their network
television peers.
HBO is not PBS. Money drives its decision-making. But because subscriptions
and DVD sales, not ads, provide its primary revenue stream,58 it need not force content
52
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producers to stop the narrative flow every eight minutes so that advertisements can run.
And because it is not a broadcast network it need not comply with restrictive FCC
regulations regarding profanity and sexual content. To the extent that Benkler’s attack on
the quality of broadcast television offerings is correct, it suggests that the market is ripe
for a shift to HBO’s subscription model or even a pay-per-view model, both of which
have become increasingly viable mechanisms for converting eyeballs into cash as a result
of recent advances in digital rights management. It is far easier to imagine such
developments in the marketplace than Benkler’s scenario of market-driven television’s
displacement by amateur uploads to YouTube.59
I.D. On the Shoulders of Howard Dean? Distributional and Political
Consequences of Social Production
In the book’s most ambitious chapter, Benkler asserts that social production will
do more than alter the production of intellectual property content. Rather, it will also help
reduce resource disparities between the world’s haves and have nots. Benkler’s book
rises to the challenge of those who would assert that scholars interested in issues of social
justice should direct their energies to things other than intellectual property law. This
challenge asks why the Somali subsistence farmer or the Bolivian slum dweller should
care about frivolous luxuries like Wikipedia or massive multi-user online games.60
Such a critique has intuitive appeal. Of course, the same criticism can be launched
at most law scholarship: What difference does Sarbanes-Oxley or the separation of
powers or customary international law make in the lives of the world’s billions of poor
people? Most legal scholars would respond, “not much,” and move on, suggesting that
the legal questions to which they devote their time still affect enough people to be worth
the enterprise. Benkler, however, is not so quick to surrender. And good for him, because
chapter nine, in which he defends the claim that “information policy has become a critical
element of development policy,”61 is the most exhilarating part of his book.
Benkler makes two persuasive claims in this chapter. First, he notes that the
market and intellectual property systems of incentives largely determine which diseases
are targeted by pharmaceutical companies. Would the marginal dollar spent on a cure for
malaria do more “good” than the marginal dollar spent on an acne treatment? Almost
certainly, by virtually any defensible measure of social welfare. But malaria kills poor
Africans and acne affects American teenagers from affluent families, so research and
development resources flow toward therapies for the relatively trivial medical
condition.62 If rewards for pharmaceutical innovation were not so heavily dependent on
59
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patent revenues, which is in turn dependent on consumers’ respective ability to pay, we
might well see an allocation of research and development dollars that saved more lives
and better reflected society’s moral intuitions.
Second, Benkler points out that information outputs can be particularly valuable
for developing nations. Widespread access to science and engineering texts, without
more, will not improve a country’s lot, but the availability of such resources combined
with other investments in education might help a country modernize its economy in a
generation or two.63 Genetically modified crops can go a very long way toward
preventing malnutrition in the developing world, but many crops that achieve much
higher per-acre yields are proprietary and hence unavailable to most third world
farmers.64 And mass media monopolies can help keep dictators in power. The
decentralized Internet poses a fundamental challenge to authoritarian regimes, because it
raises the possibility that an eloquent dissident will be heard and echoed.65
Most imaginatively, Benkler wonders about the possibility of something like
malariavaccine@home, where computer users around the world devote excess computing
capacity to the modeling and number crunching that is essential to modern
pharmaceutical research and development.66 If market economics drive firms to invest in
acne improvements rather than malaria, but people with computing resources to spare
view malaria as the greater social problem, then distributed computing and social
production might offset the marketplace’s questionable priorities. Both of Benkler’s
arguments suggest that reforming domestic and international intellectual property laws
can significantly reduce the rich-poor gap. I will say much more about these claims in
Part III.
Benkler’s final chapters are more orthodox than the earlier ones. Essentially,
Benkler takes the American and European governments to task for a series of policy
decisions that privilege market production over social production. Here, Benkler weighs
in on many contemporary debates: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (he’s against
it); the Copyright Term Extension Act (he’s against it); the litigation against peer-to-peer
file swappers (he’s against it); trademark antidilution protection (he’s against it); database
protection (he’s against it); and international intellectual property harmonization (he’s
against it, or at least against its recent manifestations). You get the idea. Benkler does not
like much of what Congress has been doing in the realm of intellectual property
protection, and is equally skeptical that courts and international entities can get it right.
Benkler forthrightly says he does not know whether these policies will succeed in
thwarting the social production revolution, but he worries that they will do a great deal of
damage.67
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I agree with much of what Benkler says in these chapters, emphatically so in the
case of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act. But Benkler’s views about these
subjects hardly differentiate him from the majority of intellectual property professors
who write about these issues.68 Many of us share Benkler’s normative priors, empirical
hunches, and dim view of recent congressional action. What is particularly interesting
about these chapters is what Benkler fails to say.
Benkler sees the antisocial production bias of congressional action as the product
of naked interest group rent seeking.69 The creative industries have powerful lobbyists,
and the public domain does not. Content creators can organize easily, but consumers
cannot.70 It is a familiar public choice refrain. Curiously, Benkler devotes chapter ten of
his book to discussing the Internet’s effect on social relations, arguing that the Internet
actually strengthens ties among people. And Benkler painstakingly assembles evidence
indicating that the Internet might help galvanize political action. “Wired” neighborhoods
seem to be fertile ground for political action.71 Blogosphere reactions have helped alter
the national political discourse on several occasions.72 Meetup.com is a web site that
helps like-minded citizens find each other and organize politically.73 In light of these
trends, it is difficult to understand why Benkler shies away from the claim that social
production will have as important an effect on political life as it has had on consumer
culture.74 Indeed, Benkler devotes just a few sentences to Meetup, even though it was
famously used by Howard Dean supporters in the 2004 presidential primaries to launch
their candidate to the front of a crowded Democratic field.75 As published, chapter ten
seems like a puzzling detour from the core of Benkler’s argument. Suggesting that the
Internet will alter the political calculus in Washington and state capitals seems like the
sensible means of connecting the dots.
Someone reading Benkler’s analysis of social networks and social ties naturally
will wonder about whether Congress will have such an easy time re-extending the
copyright term in 2018, when a vast swath of copyrights are set to expire. By that time,
there will be, on Benkler’s account, a large community of content producers who re-mix
audio and video content, and an even larger community of people to enjoy these remixes.
The Internet and subsequent communication technologies will have helped strengthen
social ties, thus lowering the costs of assembling political movements. Every trend that
Benkler identifies suggests that the political dynamics of copyright term extension in
2018 will be very different from what they were in 1998. But Benkler, who is rather
68
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optimistic about almost everything else, seems curiously silent about whether social
production will irreversibly alter the political balance of power.76 It is an argument that
others have embraced,77 so its absence is conspicuous from Benkler’s text. Maybe there
is a strong basis for Benkler’s uncharacteristic pessimism here, but having been
persuaded by much of his analysis I am dying to know his reasons.
Before concluding this brief sketch of Benkler’s argument, I want to mention a
final reason why readers interested in intellectual property and information economics
should read Benkler’s book. It is free. Benkler has made his book available under a
Creative Commons License, encouraging users to re-mix it, improve it, convert it to a
book on tape, or merely read it without paying.78 Benkler’s decision is laudable and
refreshing, and his ability to convince the Yale University Press to abide by such an
arrangement is a big deal. The publication of Benkler’s book under these terms promises
to set a precedent that will make similar arrangements more common in the future, and
that is certainly a heartening development.
II. The Health of Networks: Dangers Faced by Social Production
Benkler has chosen to write his book fairly early in the life cycle of
communications technology-driven social production. And his book is clearly bullish on
social production, to the extent that he sometimes underestimates important pitfalls that
social production is already facing or will face in the future. In this Part, I will discuss
several challenges to social production—those posed by changing user populations,
economic responses by market-producers who are competing with social producers, and
the possibility of proprietary firms appropriating the methods of social producers. Taken
together, these challenges are daunting, and they might push social production to the
peripheries of the new economy.
II.A.

March of the Trolls

The success of many socially produced resources, such as open source
programming projects, is explained by their targeting of highly sophisticated and skilled
users for participation.79 Peer-to-peer file swapping applications initially relied on
goodwill and reciprocity to encourage uploading,80 then switched to mandatory sharing
and began implementing software fixes to help users identify corrupted content.81
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Wikipedia, which Benkler discusses at length, initially let anyone add or edit
encyclopedia entries, and then began requiring authors to register before adding entries,
based on the fear that false, malicious, and libelous content was being posted by people
with axes to grind.82 Even SETI@home eventually started highlighting the contributions
of individual users, singling them out for praise.83 Internet chat rooms or blog comments
began with useful discussions, and then saw their initial audience driven out by
spammers, flamers, trolls, and know-nothings. It is a common tale, and it has afflicted a
large portion of the Internet.
There is an important lesson in these trends. Benkler’s colleague Henry Smith has
noted that when a collective resource is being regulated, society has two options:
governance or exclusion.84 Suppose a community runs a weekend food festival in a
public park. It can opt for a governance strategy, letting anyone set up a booth and then
regulating the behavior of vendors (e.g., by having a health inspector conduct random
checks of each vendor’s operations, by regulating the fat content of food that can be
served, or by controlling the profit margins of each vendor). Alternatively, it can choose
an exclusion strategy, keeping out disreputable or unknown vendors, but then giving
vendors relatively free rein at the festival (e.g., by admitting only vendors affiliated with
a Zagat-rated or Michelin-starred restaurant, or requiring that every admitted vendor be a
member of the Better Business Bureau). Plainly, the optimal regulatory strategy will
sometimes involve a mix of governance and exclusion, but Smith’s chief insight has
broad application: You can control what resource users do or, as a substitute, control
what kinds of people get to use the resource.
What does our food festival have to do with Benkler’s book? The reason so many
Internet-based forms of social production seem initially promising has to do with
selection effects. Many web-based discussion forums thrive based on the expertise of a
small number of contributors. But if a forum achieves notoriety in the mass media via
links from popular Internet portals, the successful forum will experience an inevitable
increase in the quantity of posts and a decrease in the average quality of posts. Trolls
push out the sensible discussants in short order.85 This will cause the proprietors of these
web sites to begin implementing onerous governance rules, such as deleting off-topic
comments, instituting content guidelines, prohibiting anonymous posts, and the like. Pure
social production can work very well for a relatively small group of people who toil
obscurely. But once the product of their labors becomes economically valuable or
politically influential, the riff-raff will be drawn in, and the quality of the collective
resource might well decline as a result. More generally, quality-diminishing users tend to
stay away from obscure or technical resources. After all, what is the point of being a troll
where there are few people around to read your comments? If a socially produced
82
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resource matures and goes mainstream, it becomes an increasingly inviting target for
attack. An important question that Benkler does not adequately confront is whether
socially produced resources are as resilient as market resources to malicious users. The
answer to that question is by no means clear. If a proprietary firm discovers that one of its
employees is not contributing her fair share to the firm’s bottom line, that employee can
be fired. In egregious cases, involving employee sabotage and the like, blackballing and
litigation provide further sanctioning opportunities, and the availability of these sanctions
substantially constraints employee misbehavior. These strategies are not nearly as
effective in preventing misbehavior within social production projects: the producers are
not employees, they may well be anonymous or pseudonymous, and litigation will not be
a practical option for various reasons.
Benkler confronts these issues in his book, providing an interesting case study of
Slashdot’s largely successful strategy for filtering and accreditation, which is designed to
marginalize the contributions of quality-diminishing users. To facilitate the removal of
useless or off-topic commentary, Slashdot has developed a “karma” system, whereby
users evaluate other users’ comments for their contributions to the collective discourse.
Comments deemed informative or humorous will generate good karma points for the
users who post them, and comments deemed uninformative or off-topic will bring bad
karma points.86 Slashdot readers can then decide to filter their comments, such that the
posts of users with bad karma profiles will not appear on their screens. To be sure, some
intelligent or funny comments will be suppressed through this system. Even a blind hog
finds an acorn now and again. Still, Slashdot’s system is elegant, if cumbersome and
underinclusive. The Slashdot experience might not be generalizable, however. The karma
system does a fine job of dealing with the occasional annoying troll, but a few dozen
trolls, working together to rate each other’s posts positively, could threaten the karma
system. First, Slashdot, which bills itself as a source of “news for nerds” benefits from
self-selection among its readers, who will tend to be relatively intelligent and predisposed
toward cooperation in the site’s karma-scoring system.87 Second, Slashdot has no natural
predators. Because it threatens neither the business model of a large firm nor the
ideological interests of a well-organized interest group, there is little chance of a
coordinated attack on its karma system. The same cannot be said for other socially
produced resources, which means that the Slashdot model might not be particularly
generalizable.
Wikipedia faced distinct types of threats. The primary threats consisted of
pranksters and ideologues. The former wished to reduce the encyclopedia’s accuracy as a
way of having fun. The latter wished to alter the encyclopedia’s content as a way of
spreading their own beliefs about controversial subjects. Wikipedia was able to
ameliorate these problems through a series of governance rules: barring anonymous edits
and flagging as “controversial” material that was subject to frequent revision and rerevision. Wikipedia also faces a threat much like the one that posed legal headaches for
peer-to-peer networks: plagiarism by Wikipedia authors. Here, Wikipedia relies on its
86
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readers to identify and police instances of plagiarism.88 Wikipedia has had a somewhat
easier time with this problem than the peer-to-peer networks for understandable reasons.
Without the widespread availability of unlicensed copies of media content, few people
would be interested in using peer-to-peer networks. Wikipedia, on the other hand, would
still provide an attractive resource even if all the infringing content on it were removed.
Now imagine if Encyclopedia Britannica determined that Wikipedia’s success
was cutting into Britannica’s profit margins. Suppose that the makers of Britannica began
hiring people to implant objective errors into Wikipedia’s text that might not get
corrected by Wikipedia’s editors but that would make some people who relied on those
erroneous entries look foolish. Britannica might defeat Wikipedia’s accreditation controls
by hiring others to affirm the correctness of erroneous entries. To the best of my
knowledge, this has not happened, and Britannica might suffer substantial reputational
sanctions in the publishing industry if it tried this approach. Indeed, there might be legal
liability for Britannica too, perhaps under an unfair competition cause of action.89 This
hypothetical Britannica approach is a close cousin to the strategy adopted by the
Recording Industry Association of America against the peer-to-peer file swapping
networks. In a process called spoofing, the recording industry hired various third parties
to create corrupted versions of sound recordings and upload them repeatedly to the peerto-peer networks, where they were passed along by unsuspecting users. This spoofing
practice substantially raised the frustration costs associated with using the peer-to-peer
networks, and may have driven many users toward iTunes and other outlets for licensed
copies of mp3 sound recordings.90 In short, even social producers like Wikipedia that
have not been confronted with well-organized, malicious campaigns, can expect to
encounter them as they pose increasing threats to the business models of proprietary
firms.
II.B.

Excess Capacity as Profit Opportunity

If Benkler’s prognostications about the future are right, then social production
will increasingly take “market share” away from firms following proprietary models.
Benkler’s analysis of how proprietary firms will respond focuses almost exclusively on
their likely lobbying efforts, but their responses in the marketplace may be more potent
than their legislative efforts. Some firms, like Britannica, will respond to the challenge by
trying to build a better proprietary product, or informing consumers about the pros and
cons of the proprietary and socially produced products. Other firms, like those in the
recording industry, will attack their social production foes directly, through spoofing-like
strategies.
There is a third type of anti social-production strategy that we can expect clever
firms to pursue. Suppose that SETI@home-style projects ultimately eat into the sales of
88
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IBM and other supercomputers. How might IBM respond? Recall Benkler’s argument
that large-scale social production can only arise when excess capacity exists in the
system. Lots of people have extra computing resources and no ability to do anything with
those resources, so they are all too happy to donate those resources to the search for little
green men, a malaria cure, or what not. But suppose a new firm, Acme Networking,
entered the market: Acme pays PC owners for their excess computing resources and then
aggregates these resources for sale to proprietary pharmaceutical firms or defense
contractors. A PC owner would now face a choice: She could download the SETI@home
screen saver and give away her excess capacity, or she could sell that excess capacity to
Acme for $3, $5, or $15 a month. A few people would still donate their excess capacity,
but many more would now sell it to Acme.
Benkler responds by arguing that the transaction costs of negotiating a contract
between Acme and computer owners would exceed Acme’s potential to profit from this
arrangement.91 I am not completely convinced, 92 but even if Benkler is right and I am
wrong, it is easy to imagine next-generation computing devices profoundly altering the
calculus in a way that empowers the Acmes of the world. Excess capacity exists on PCs
because a user can access data off his personal hard drive more quickly than he can
access data from a remote server. But the rise of networked computing and broadband
connections has substantially reduced the discrepancy between these methods of
retrieving data. Further reductions in that differential could make the individual PC hard
drive a thing of the past, thanks to economies of scale. As soon as that happens, it is easy
to imagine firms offering computer users a pricing scheme that charges them for the
amount of data that they actually process, not the amount of data that their system might
store and access, if operating at capacity. “Extra” hard drive space and processor capacity
could become a relic of the past within the next decade.
Benkler’s analysis of social production, then, implies that money is being left on
the table. When there is money on the table, start-ups like Acme eventually figure out
ways to grab it. And, in this case, proprietary firms facing competition from social
producers would have an incentive to underwrite Acme’s entry into the marketplace.
How would SETI@home respond to this challenge? It’s hard to say. It might start paying
people for their excess capacity. But at that point, it would no longer be in the social
production “business.” It might survive with fewer contributions. But now it would no
longer look like the wave of the future. Rather, it would exist as a nice way for a small,
self-selecting group of do-gooders to donate a resource that most people manage to sell.
In essence, by identifying excess capacity as a key ingredient to social production,
Benkler has simultaneously pointed to social production’s Achilles Heel. Where we
observe excess capacity, and social production is the only thing exploiting that capacity, a
91
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market opportunity exists. Once excess capacity becomes significant enough to engender
substantial opportunities for doing good in the world, social production projects will face
real competition from proprietary firms over that capacity. At present, computer users’
excess capacity remains largely untapped by the proprietary market. But make no
mistake: This is a temporary situation, sure to change as technology evolves.
We are already seeing proprietary firms tap the sort of excess human capital that
drives Wikipedia. Amazon has launched the Mechanical Turk,93 a “crowdsourcing” web
site that pays volunteers amounts ranging from a penny to several dollars for performing
tasks that cannot be automated on a cost-effective basis.94 Entrepreneurs working in the
business see their sites as a threat to Wikipedia, Youtube, and social networking web sites
where users receive no monetary rewards for their contributions.95 Of course, writing a
Wikipedia entry may be more fun than responding to a survey, identifying faces in a
photograph, or transcribing audio clips – tasks currently assigned to Mechanical Turk
workers. Despite this, the web site seems to attract “hobbyists” not too different from the
amateurs who would contribute to Wikipedia.96
The initial success of Mechanical Turk in paying people to contribute labor via
the Internet raises one glaring question. Why hasn’t my hypothetical Acme Corporation
entered the market for excess physical capacity? In reality, a variant of the Acme
business model has developed, though on an in-kind, rather than cash, basis. Aptly
enough, it is the Acme model has made peer-to-peer (p2p) file swapping application
development a potentially profitable enterprise.
The business method pursued by Kazaa, Morpheus, and many other developers of
p2p applications depended on bundling those desirable applications with undesirable
spyware.97 Users sometimes had to opt out of installing the spyware along with the p2p
applications, and sometimes there were no opt-out or un-installation opportunities for
users.98 Spyware presently infects approximately 90% of all Internet-connected
computers, and most computer users are unaware that spyware is running in the
background, monitoring their online activities.99 Spyware did two things: First, it tracked
the online activities of people on whose computers it had been installed. Second, and
relatedly, it absorbed large quantities of the users’ excess computing capacity in order to
do so. On many machines, bundled p2p spyware dramatically reduced available
computing resources.100 Some spyware programs sucked away not only excess capacity,
but necessary capacity that users were trying to use for basic applications, resulting in
system crashes. 101
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Benkler’s book is plainly conflicted about the use of p2p. He loves the technology
but disapproves of its use for the purposes of copyright infringement.102 Yet the untold
story of p2p is spyware bundling. There is no such thing as a free lunch, at least not after
Napster. Users who downloaded unlicensed copies of mp3 sound recordings were paying
for those files just as iTunes users were. The latter paid with cash, the former paid with
computing resources, and many a functional PC was rendered virtually inoperable by
bundled spyware and malware. Indeed, bundled spyware imposed costs on social
producers like SETI@home too, by reducing the excess computing capacity that could be
donated to worthy distributed computing projects.
There is a second wrinkle in the Acme story. This part of the story actually has to
do with the weaknesses of intellectual property protection. Suppose that Merck wanted to
purchase excess computing capacity from me, you, and others for the purposes of
modeling new vaccines and crunching assorted numbers relating to the development of a
new drug. This distributed-computing based research and development would take place
before Merck filed a patent application or sought FDA approval for their innovation. By
contracting out computational tasks to numerous computers, Merck would be exposing
ideas that could be misappropriated by a competitor firm, such as Pfizer, which might
then seek to beat Merck to the punch, and patent Merck’s innovation out from under
them. Contributing one or two computers to Merck’s project would not permit Pfizer to
glean much about Merck’s research agenda. But analyzing the data from a few dozen
computers might provide Pfizer with very valuable information.103
In principle, the law might protect Merck in these circumstances. If it turns out
that Pfizer was able to reverse engineer Merck’s new cancer therapy based on
information gleaned from computer users providing Merck with excess capacity, then
Pfizer might be liable for trade secret misappropriation. Or it might not. A court could
well hold that by disclosing proprietary information to strangers, they had failed to
exercise the “reasonable precautions” that are the sine qua non of trade secrecy
protection.104 Alternatively, even if Merck tried to protect itself by writing contracts that
forbade users from peeking at the data that their machines were crunching, it would be
relatively easy for Pfizer to cover its tracks, convincing a court that it arrived at the
insights relating to Merck’s line of research through legally permissible independent
invention and not via inducing contractual breaches. Intellectual property law thus might
help explain not only social production, but the puzzling persistence of excess capacity as
well. Nonprofit entities seeking to find extraterrestrial life do not need to worry too much
about “competitors” misappropriating their findings via participation in a distributed
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computing project. Proprietary firms should, by contrast, worry about trade secret
misappropriation a great deal.
III.C. If You Can’t Beat Them, Appropriate Their Methods
Though Berkeley’s SETI@home and Wikipedia are nonproprietary, many of the
examples of social production that Benkler provides were organized by, and remain
controlled by, profit-seeking firms. His examples of social production include Linden
Lab, a proprietary software firm that developed Second Life, the massive multi-user
online game where users create much of the virtual world that player’s encounter,105
IBM, which has turned Linux-related service contracts into a major revenue stream,106
and Google, which built a powerful search engine based on its own users’ judgments of
what search results are clickworthy.107 But these examples only scratch the surface. A
large number of proprietary firms have duplicated Linden Lab’s strategy of convincing
their user bases to engage in social production in service of the firms’ bottom lines.
Myspace has become a profitable social networking site with a successful business
model, having convinced its almost 80 million users to create engaging content for free
and placed ads alongside that content.108 Youtube follows a similar business model,
pairing user-created video content with advertisements. Tripadvisor.com collects a wealth
of information from its users about hotels, restaurants, airlines, and travel destinations,
then makes money by linking up users with the vendors being reviewed. Netflix collects
millions of user evaluations of films and books, and then offers personalized
recommendations to its users based on what those with similar tastes liked.109 Netflix also
offers a “Friends” feature that allows users to see what DVDs their friends have watched
and how well they liked them.110 iTunes lets users post and share lists of favorite songs, a
new and improved version of a functionality that originally appeared on Napster. And,
the granddaddy of them all, eBay, has become enormously profitable thanks to a socially
produced system of feedback rankings, where users evaluate each other’s honesty,
promptness, and courteousness.
Collectively, these examples suggest that social production is as likely to become
a tool of market production as a competitor to it. There is little reason to think that
nonprofit entities will outcompete proprietary firms using the same, decentralized, useroriented production methods. This analysis suggests that some of the content that is
currently socially produced will be brought back within the Coasean firm. For example, it
is easy to imagine an ad-supported online encyclopedia with some ad revenues diverted
toward fact-checking and policing vandalism displacing Wikipedia. Proprietary variants
of open source programs are also easy to imagine, with firms making their source code
available online, and providing cash bounties to any contributor who can generate more
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elegant code or fix bugs. The nonproprietary sector may have been where social
production first succeeded, but the proprietary sector seems as likely to be the place
where decentralized, user-production is perfected. Indeed, Netflix recently pursued just
such a strategy, offering a million dollar bounty to anyone who could help the company
improve the accuracy of its algorithm for recommending films based on socially
produced movie ratings.111
III.

The Progressivity of Networks

Benkler’s application of transaction cost analysis to social production is a theme
that was richly developed in his now canonical earlier work.112 The really new and
exciting part of The Wealth of Networks is Benkler’s chapter on information policy as a
tool for promoting global development. Here, Benkler champions social production as an
effective force for closing the wealth gap that divides rich nations from poor nations. To
that end, he argues on behalf of numerous legal and political changes that will unleash the
forces of social production, leaving a global economy transformed.
Benkler’s claims here are both categorical and specific. At the broadest level,
Benkler notes the propensity for socially produced resources to be made available free of
charge, enabling the poor to access basic information and marketplaces free of charge,
whereas they would be unable to do so if they were forced to pay for access to these
resources, as typically occurs for proprietary resources.113 More concretely, Benkler
submits that social production has enormous potential to help the poor obtain life’s
necessities, such as pharmaceuticals, genetically engineered seeds,114 as well as tools that
can help them compete in a global economy, like free software and educational texts.115
Benkler’s bold analysis runs into two major problems here, however. First, as
proprietary firms increasingly employ the means used by social producers, we will see
them roll out social production technologies that seem poised to divide the rich and the
poor, rather than bringing them together. Socially produced reputation systems seem as
commercially promising as any of the socially produced resources that Benkler discusses,
and these reputation systems’ primary function is to reward the trustworthy and punish
the untrustworthy. As society increasingly comes to rely on reputation and feedback, and
as reputations become transportable across platforms and applications, bad reputations
will ensure that untrustworthy or discourteous people become and remain poor.
111
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Second, while Benkler is extremely well versed in transaction cost economics, his
book neglects to grapple with a more recent, but nearly as important, development in law
and economics: optimal redistribution analysis. If we take account of the literature on
redistribution, we will emerge less enamored with the wisdom of using the tools that
Benkler has identified for the entirely laudable purpose of helping the developing world
grow. Let us take these two arguments in order.
III.A. Reputation and Meritocracy
Reputation scoring is among the most important form of social production to
emerge in the last decade. Reputation scores are a socially produced resource under
almost any definition—users of a network provide feedback about the performance of
other network members, and typically do not receive payments or other rewards in
exchange for contributing to this valuable public good. EBay’s feedback system has
arguably revolutionized our economy as much as Linux and other open source
programming projects. In the coming years, we might well see the development of
software applications that merge eBay-style feedback rankings with MySpace-style social
networking capabilities. Current feedback systems will soon seem antiquated, and overall
feedback scores like eBay’s will be replaced with far more fine-grained data, allowing me
to ask, for example, how well fellow University of Chicago professors or Berkley alumni
rated a particular real estate agent, hair stylist, or hotel concierge. The rise of “wearable
communities” might allow us to evaluate the reputations of strangers we come into
contact with in public far more accurately than is presently possible.116 It seems entirely
plausible that within a short period of time, all of us, not just eBay sellers or restaurants,
will be ranked and rated by our peers, and these reputation scores will be transportable
across platforms, be they online or off-line.
These socially produced ubiquitous reputation systems stand poised to generate
enormous wealth. After all, they can help us reward the trustworthy and collectively deter
or sanction the devious or opportunistic. Ubiquitous feedback networks will allow us to
move beyond inaccurate snap judgments, where we decide whether or not to trust
someone based on their race, apparel, accent, name, or beauty. At the same time, these
technologies could help ensure the persistence of a reputational underclass. Social
production stands poised to make the structure of societal relations far more transparent
than it currently is, and that transparency will facilitate forms of exclusion that are not
currently possible. In short, it is impossible to characterize the distributional
consequences of social production without knowing more about the extent to which
society will embrace socially produced ubiquitous feedback networks. If they succeed in
weeding out false feedback, such networks will reward merit, character, business savvy,
and charm, in the process engendering both upward- and downward-mobility.117 At
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present, failures in the reputation information “marketplace” inappropriately prop up the
undeserving rich and keep down the deserving poor. The implication for economic
inequality seems clear in a world of ubiquitous, socially produced reputation. Because
there will always be people with deservedly poor reputations, there will always be poor
people.
Some of this stratification is laudable. When a down-on-his luck conman cheats a
well-off but naïve senior citizen out of half her retirement savings, we hardly want to
applaud the wealth transfer for its progressivity. A chief advantage of reputation and
feedback systems is that it helps solidify trust in the marketplace and encourages people
to behave honestly and courteously. These benefits should be sufficient to alleviate our
guilt about the effects that these systems have on the irredeemably dishonest and
discourteous people among us. So whereas social production on the whole might increase
economic inequality, its tendency to do so on meritocratic grounds should hardly render
us hostile to the growth of social production.
Relatedly, in the past year or so, a few developments have suggested the
possibility of a new kind of social production revolution, one that employs that method of
production to strengthen the enforcement of formal laws and informal norms. The Texas
“virtual minutemen” project might not be an outlier. An enterprising entrepreneur in New
York City has allowed parents to slap “How’s My Nanny?” stickers on the backs of
strollers, so that concerned citizens can report nanny misconduct to the parents of the
affected children.118 The Cincinnati Bengals football team have implemented a social
production scheme to help maintain order at their games. Fans who witness hooliganism
or rowdy behavior can call a telephone number, and report it to stadium authorities, who
will use cameras mounted all over the stadium to zoom in on the site of the report, verify
the conduct, and take action against the offenders.119 These developments have not gone
unnoticed in the legal academy. A young professor at a respectable school recently
proposed the launch of a compulsory new social production system that would police
aggressive and inconsiderate driving on urban roadways by requiring the installation of
“How’s My Driving?” stickers on all passenger vehicles.120
The enforcement of social norms has always been somewhat puzzling in light of
the costs of sanctioning norm violators. Just as technology has facilitated the social
production of creative content, these developments seem poised to facilitate the social
production of law and norm enforcement. As a result, laws and norms will be enforced
more efficiently, and those who violate laws or norms will be more readily identifiable.
These sorts of developments may be worth applauding (or not), but it is difficult to argue
that they will reduce inequality. It seems much more likely that by assisting in the
willingness of managers to break into international markets, tells only part of the story. International
customers often make demands in terms of product and support service quality that domestic customers do
not make. The latter point is particularly important, for it draws attention to the human capital requirements
for successful e-commerce.”).
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identification and sanctioning of those who break the law or violate widely shared social
norms, reputation and decentralized law enforcement systems will contribute to social
and economic stratification.
III.B. Bill Gates Has Shoulders Too: Optimal Redistribution and Social
Production
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the equality-promoting tendencies of
social production that Benkler has identified trump the inequality-promoting tendencies
that I have identified. Should we, as Benkler argues, promote economic equality by
promoting social production? We can turn to the law and economics literature to help
answer that question.
In 1994, Kaplow and Shavell published an important essay in the Journal of Legal
Studies arguing that distributive justice goals should be furthered, not through the
adoption of legal rules designed to help the poor, but through the tax system.121 Their
argument was elegant and straightforward: “Even though the income tax distorts work
incentives, any regime with an inefficient legal rule can be replaced by a regime with an
efficient legal rule and a modified income tax system designed so that every person is
made better off.”122 Any time the law embraces an inefficient legal rule for the sake of
redistribution, resources are left on the table, and society is worse off than it otherwise
might be.123 Put another way, the tax system inevitably distorts less than legal rules do.
While the tax system distorts incentives to work, an inefficient legal rule distorts labor
incentives to the same degree, while simultaneously distorting incentives to engage in the
conduct regulated by the legal rule. Although Kaplow and Shavell’s argument has been
criticized by law and economics scholars,124 it has held up quite well, so much so that
many scholars now essentially take its conclusion for granted.125 Kaplow and Shavell’s
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basic argument has been applied to intellectual property126 and international legal rules,127
among other things.
We should apply this principle to Benkler’s argument in two different ways. First,
if the strong version of Benkler’s empirical claim is right, and legal rules promoting
social production are quite likely per se superior to legal rules promoting proprietary
production, then Benkler’s analysis in chapter nine is superfluous. The law should just
embrace the efficient legal rule and trust that doing so will create wealth that can make
both the haves and have nots better off. If it turns out that social-production promoting
rules are wealth maximizing but regressive, then society should redistribute some of the
newly generated wealth to those made worse off by such rules.
If the strongest version of Benkler’s empirical conclusion is wrong, and legal
rules that promote social production at the expense of proprietary production are
sometimes inefficient, then by embracing those rules society could hinder economic
development in the third world. If social-production promoting rules are wealth
diminishing but progressive, legislators and judges should embrace the most efficient
legal rule and then promote redistribution from the haves to the have nots of the extra
wealth generated by the shift to the Pareto superior rule. This redistribution should be
accomplished via the most efficient mechanism – direct transfer payments to the poor –
or, as a second best alternative, trade policies that are tailored to benefit poor countries.
There is likely a knee-jerk response to this second, more interesting, application
of Kaplow and Shavell to Benkler. Namely, even if such wealth redistribution could
occur, creating a Pareto superior state of affairs, in actuality it is unlikely to occur,
resulting in a mere Kaldor-Hicks improvement over the inefficient but fairer pro-social
production legal rule. In actuality, however, it is not so crazy to imagine these transfers
taking place. Such redistribution is occurring as you read these words.
The name “Bill Gates” does not appear in The Wealth of Networks, but his is the
face most associated with the rise of the information economy. The world’s richest
person earned that title largely as a result of the incentives created by the intellectual
property system. Gates and his spouse have announced that they intend to devote the vast
majority of their wealth to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. That entity already has
become the world’s largest charitable foundation, with a $29.2 billion endowment as of
June 2006,128 and has made fighting global poverty and disease its top priority.129 It
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seems unlikely that we can get more redistributive bang for our buck by tweaking
intellectual property rules to promote social production than we can by giving an
enormous pot of money to the Gates Foundation and letting them spend it on the most
promising antipoverty programs they can identify. Assuming that social-production
promoting rules are not inherently more efficient than legal rules that promote market
production, targeted assistance should dominate roundabout benefits.
The Gates Foundation example shows the difficulty of the issues raised by chapter
nine of Benkler’s book. If we accept Benkler’s premise that narrowing the gap between
people in the first and third worlds is a moral imperative, but are skeptical about
Benkler’s empirical claim that rules promoting social production are quite likely to be
Pareto superior to rules promoting proprietary production, then we must decide how best
to further a laudable objective. It may well be that the adoption of efficient rules
promoting proprietary production is the best course of action here, because those rules
enable the Microsofts of the world to amass enormous financial resources, which they
then can and sometimes do redistribute in the service of third world economic
development. Failing that, trade liberalization more generally seems more likely to do the
trick than altering domestic intellectual property laws.
Of course, there is nothing to guarantee that Bill and Melinda Gates decide to
devote their wealth to fighting global disease and poverty. They might donate their
money to college athletic departments or well-endowed prep schools, as some other
wealthy people do. But the same is true for social production. Social production is like
tofu. It has no values of its own. Rather, social production absorbs the preferences of its
users. If participants in a social production network want to help keep poor Guatemalans
from entering the rich United States in search of enhanced economic opportunities, they
can do so. If computer owners want to spend their time looking for signs of alien life in
outer space, not disease cures for Earthlings, they can do so.
It is possible that average Joes have stronger abstract preferences for progressive
resource redistribution than wealthy entrepreneurs.130 But the available evidence seems
more supportive of the opposite view. Rich Americans donate a higher percentage of
their income to charity than poor Americans do,131 and the nature of their contributions
differ from those of the less affluent.132 Survey evidence suggests relatively progressive
has also identified fighting poverty around the world as one of its primary objectives, and seems
particularly focused on fighting infectious diseases in the developing world. See Katie Hafner,
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goals among the very rich. Multi-millionaires surveyed identified educational
improvements, poverty, inequality, hunger, affordable housing, and health care for the
uninsured as the policy issues they most want to influence through their charitable
giving,133 though they seem less committed to the cause of third world development than
the Gates Foundation is.134 Finally, recent research into philanthropic motivations shows
that money that is earned is much more likely to be donated to charity than money that is
obtained via inheritance.135 If intellectual property regimes are good at creating private
wealth, then, by extension they might be good at promoting progressive redistributions.
In sum, if I have drawn the correct inferences from the available data, then the people
who are made wealthy by exclusive rights to intellectual property may be more
committed to combating resource inequality than the millions of ordinary citizens who
participate in social production projects.136
Conclusion
Ponder for a moment the two stories I recounted at the outset.
A Texas Governor uses social production to help keep job-seeking Latin
American immigrants from entering the United States. This is an example of social
production being used to reinforce existing economic inequality.
Telemarketers from the developing world begin using Skype, a VoIP network that
had lowered the cost of voice communications to zero for many long distance calls. As a
result, Skype users stop accepting calls from people unknown to them, reducing much of
the value of the communications network. The openness of the Skype network was
threatened by the opportunistic new users, who did not share the values of the network’s
preexisting users.
These are two stories of social production, but they are stories with unhappy
endings, at least if the relevant yardsticks are social equality, openness, and freedom.
Such stories do not appear in The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production
Transforms Markets and Freedom, but placing such stories alongside Benkler’s sunnier
account is essential if we are to understand the changes that social production and
noncash market production will engender in the information age. There is no guarantee
that, even if government stays on the sidelines, nonmarket production will displace
market production as broadly as Benkler envisions. Indeed, serious obstacles
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systematically will confront social production enterprises, as if placed there by some
invisible hand.
Let there be no mistaking my bottom line. Any reader will learn a great deal from
Benkler’s book, and his synthesis of economics, political theory, and intellectual property
law is extremely impressive. This book aspires to, and deserves, a place in the intellectual
property canon. Benkler’s analysis of intellectual property and global development issues
is ambitious and will be profoundly influential. Yet we can learn a lot from this book’s
imperfections too. Among these, two stand out. First, Benkler seems insufficiently
sensitive to the way selection effects and competitive pressures will govern the rise and
fall of social production. Whenever social production creates a valuable resource that
large numbers of citizens want to use, that resource becomes an attractive target for the
mischief makers, proprietary competitors, free riders, sketchy opportunists, and wellmeaning dolts whose arrival can drive away the cooperators who built the successful
network. Social production networks tend to be open by their nature, and that openness
carries with it vulnerability to malicious attack and proprietary appropriation. It is
premature to write about the success of social production without analyzing how social
production networks can respond to the threats posed by early successes. Social
production in the hands of minutemen, telemarketers, trolls, and spyware developers is
hardly worth celebrating.
Second, Benkler’s approach to international development, while provocative and
laudable, seems unduly roundabout and perhaps even misguided. If, as Benkler
sometimes suggests, legal rules favoring social production are simply more efficient than
rules favoring proprietary production, then Benkler’s creative distributional arguments
begin to resemble a purely academic exercise. But if, as seems more likely, legal rules
that favor proprietary production are sometimes welfare-maximizing, then Benkler must
explain why the standard assumption of law and economics analysis is inapplicable.
Directed wealth transfers, not blunt legal rules, are presumptively the best means for
accomplishing the ends of wealth redistribution.
These points in conjunction bring us to a rather odd ending place. There is a lot of
economics and not a lot of law in The Wealth of Networks. And yet Benkler’s book could
use more of the former and less of the latter. The most important looming threats to social
production are basic economic forces, not legal constructs. If social production is as
transformative as Benkler suggests it is, then the economic realities should alter the
political calculus in short order. Inefficient incumbent industries can only plug their
fingers in the dikes for so long. But if Benkler’s assessment of the economics of social
production turns out to be too rosy, then such production will remain a fascinating but
peripheral phenomenon that leaves the world mostly untransformed, regardless of what
legislators and judges have to say about the matter.
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